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What is smallpox?
Smallpox (Variola) is an acute contagious viral dis-
ease that has a relatively high fatality rate in an
immunologically naive population.
Smallpox is a member of the larger pox family of
viruses.
Smallpox canmanifest itself in two clinical forms:
Variola major and Variola minor. Variola major in its
common manifestation is more widely known as a
consequence of the extensive rashes and pustules
covering large parts of the body and the ugly lesions
that mark the survivors for the remainder of their
life. In 30 percent of cases the infection is fatal.
However, there are two rare types of smallpox
infection, namely malignant (or flat) and hemorrha-
gic smallpox, that are extremely severe and almost
always fatal (mortality rates are 95—100 percent
and 94 percent, respectively, in unvaccinated vic-
tims). In cases of malignant smallpox no pustules
are formed, but the lesions remain soft and flat
instead. Hemorrhagic smallpox is characterized by
hemorrhage into the mucous membranes and the
skin. There also exists a mild form of Variola major,
which occurs in people who were previously vacci-
nated. The latter three types accounted for less
than 10 percent of all cases. Variola minor, or alas-
trim, is rarer and its consequences less severe,$ BioWeapons Prevention Project
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Variola major. Mortality averaged around one per-
cent of infected people.
Smallpox can be transmitted from person to per-
son after direct and fairly prolonged face-to-face
contact, or through direct contact with bodily fluids
of an infected person or contaminated bedding,
clothing, or other fomites. (The virus can remain
viable for about 1 week outside a human.) An infec-
tious individual becomes most contagious with the
onset of the rash, about 14—18 days after the infec-
tion, and remains contagious to others until the last
scab has fallen off. However, the large amounts of
virus shed from the skin are not very infectious, and
the risk of transmitting the disease is consequently
lower. Avery high percentage of the survivors (65—80
percent) are scarred with pockmarks, while up to a
third suffer permanent blindness.
Insects or other animal vectors do not play a role
in the transmission of smallpox. There is no specific
treatment of smallpox other than the management
of symptoms. Vaccination was key to the preventive
strategies until the eradication of smallpox was
complete. It is nevertheless possible to vaccinate
an infected person up to four days after exposure,
resulting in immunity or arresting the severity of the
disease.
How did smallpox affect civilization in
the past?
Smallpox afflicted humankind for several thousands
of years. It is believed to have originated about 3000es. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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mortality rate, smallpox epidemics impacted on the
course of history. For example, Indian civilizations in
the Americas collapsed following the arrival of Eur-
opean explorers and colonizers in the 16th century.
It is estimated that in the early 1950s there were
50 million cases of smallpox worldwide each year.
Was the smallpox eradication program
successful?
Origins of vaccination: In 1798 Edward Jenner
demonstrated that smallpox could be controlled
through inoculation with the related cowpox virus.
His technique replaced earlier efforts to inoculate
people with the causative agent of smallpox itself,
which carried a high risk of a fatal or mutilating
infection.
Origins of WHO program
In 1967 the World Health Organization (WHO)
launched an intensified smallpox eradication pro-
gram under Donald H. Henderson.
Results
The last case of naturally occurring smallpox in the
world was in Somalia in 1977; a case of fatal expo-
sure to the virus happened in a British laboratory in
1978. A scientific commission concluded in Decem-
ber 1979 that smallpox had been globally eradicated
and the World Health Assembly endorsed its findings
in 1980.
Which countries possess the smallpox virus?
Is it in the hands of terrorists?
Officially smallpox strains are in two WHO-desig-
nated repositories only, namely the WHO Collabor-
ating Centre for Smallpox & Other Poxvirus
Infections, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia (USA) and the WHO
Collaborating Centre for Orthopoxvirus Diagnosis
and Repository for Variola Virus Strains and DNA,
State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology
‘Vector’ in Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Region, Russian
Federation.
The Soviet Union was said to have embarked on a
major smallpox production program in the early
1980s (when the world was formally declared free
from the disease). Even today, some US sources still
accuse Russia of maintaining a facility capable of
producing tonnes of the virus per year and support-
ing a research program into more virulent and con-
tagious smallpox strains. Moreover, fear exists that
even if the Russians closed down these programs,
the expertise may have moved to other countries.US smallpox proliferation claims are partly rooted in
this fear.
The countries the United States lists with regard
to its concerns over smallpox proliferation are the
same ones it lists with regard to chemical and
biological weapon (CBW) proliferation in general:
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. However, no
conclusive evidence that the proliferation has actu-
ally taken place has been presented in public. Since
the occupation of Iraq by US-led coalition forces in
April 2003, evidence of Iraqi CBW stockpiles or a
recent active CBW research and development pro-
gram has proved elusive. (Nevertheless, in the 1990s
UN inspection teams found evidence of Iraqi work on
camelpox.) According to the Washington Post (5
November 2002), a US intelligence review also
included France in the list of countries possessing
undeclared stocks of the smallpox virus, using it to
research defensive mechanisms in the case of an
outbreak. France categorically denied the allega-
tion, and said that it is conducting its research with
authorized animal samples.
The intelligence review also indicated that the Al
Qaeda terrorist network was interested in the virus.
What is today’s smallpox threat?
The smallpox threat is defined to a large extent by
the projection of past experiences into a future of
new technological opportunities for the deliberate
spread of disease; new security actors like terrorists
and rogue states; and a global population that is
increasingly immunologically naive as a conse-
quence of the termination of mandatory vaccina-
tions in the 1970s and 1980s. Threat warnings
habitually emphasize the high case-fatality rates
and transmissibility of the virus, characteristics that
make them ideal candidates for bio-terrorism.
The assessment of the threat depends largely on
what factors of disease propagation participants in
the debate wish to emphasize. People who came
down with Variola major were usually bedridden
before the onset of rash (i.e., the most contagious
phase) and remained so until the disease had run its
course. As a consequence of the limitation on move-
ment the number of people that could be infected
through direct interaction with the patient was
limited. (In contrast, the effects of Variola minor
are less debilitating during the most contagious
phase so that the infected individuals remained
ambulatory and transmitted the disease over amuch
wider area.) This seems to limit the possibility of the
disease spreading like wildfire or the likelihood of a
self-infected suicide terrorist contaminating large
numbers of people in crowded areas.
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must be on epidemic control. This means that in the
case of deliberate release of the virus there will be a
number of victims, including fatalities, before the
outbreak can be contained. Besides the availability
of vaccines, the presence of a developed and opera-
tional disease surveillance infrastructure is key to
limiting the consequences of the outbreak. First, it
will allow speedy detection of the outbreak, and
second, trace the route of the outbreak in order to
maximize the effectiveness of vaccination strate-
gies and thus contribute (together with patient
isolation) to the breaking of the transmission chain.
Some concern has been expressed that malignant
research might try to elucidate the mechanisms
that contribute to the development of hemorrhagic
smallpox, as its mortality rates are much higher
than the common form and the darkening of the
skin and excretion of black fluids would maximize its
terrorizing effect.
In the event of an outbreak today, what
might happen?
Smallpox epidemics tended to develop relatively
slowly with a 2—3 week interval between each
generation. Furthermore, with natural outbreaks,
an infected person would rarely transmit the virus to
as many as five other individuals. However, the
statistics collected during the WHO eradication pro-
gram were based on observations of populations
with immunity from vaccination or previous expo-
sure. Some recent estimates suggest that on aver-
age up to ten people could be infected by a single
source as a consequence of the receding immunity in
the world’s populations.
On the other hand, the ventilation systems in
buildings allow the infection of individuals in
removed or otherwise unconnected rooms, suggest-
ing a vulnerability in the confined spaces of modern
structures.
Can governments take useful measures to
deal with the smallpox concerns?
Generic measures, which can also be applied in the
remote eventuality of a smallpox outbreak, can deal
with most aspects of the threat posed by biological
(and chemical) terrorism. No government can pre-
pare to deal with all contingencies, because the
range of possibilities is bewilderingly wide. The
measures to be taken in order to prevent acts of
terrorism, protect the population and infrastruc-
ture, and deal with the consequences of a terrorist
event must be designed and executed in such a way
that they cause the least disruption to economic andsocial activities and do not diminish the fundamental
organizing principles of a society. While it is neces-
sary for policy makers to sufficiently prioritize the
threats posed by biological terrorism, it is equally
important not to excessively dramatize the threat
and especially the consequences of hypothetical
events. A range of generic measures that bolster
the existing health and emergency infrastructure
and procedures may go a long way in dealing with
such threats. Rather than disrupting the respective
societies, they may actually be beneficial.
Among such measures are investments in the
health infrastructure so that there is a good regional
distribution of emergency wards and a spare capacity
of beds. Furthermore, it may be sound policy to fund
the establishment of an adequate number of specia-
lized laboratories in geographically distributed hos-
pitals for rapid identification of rare pathogens in
order to be able to rapidly give first responders and
other emergency personnel information about the
nature of the infection. Annual refresher and training
courses for doctors and other medical staff can be
used to familiarize them with unusual diseases -
including smallpox - in order to improve their ability
for rapid and accurate diagnoses.
Other important investments are in areas of
compatible communications technologies for the
different emergency services and adequate field
detection and diagnostic equipment for the civil
emergency units, and the creation of sufficient
supplies of medication and equipment. Recurring
realistic exercises must be conducted in order to
test and improve procedures and equipment.
Specific requirements include the stockpiling of
vaccines and medication against biological warfare
agents.
Before there is a serious incident - especially with
a highly contagious pathogen - government autho-
rities should identify the priority services and per-
sonnel who should have access to pretreatments and
medication. These groups of people extend beyond
the obvious categories of first responders, medical
staff, and police forces. In the just-in-time econo-
mies of advanced industrialized states, personnel
responsible for the energy supply, food distribution,
and so on, are equally vital to prevent the collapse
of a functioning society. Such an assessment should
be based on the careful analysis of the functioning of
critical infrastructure and integration of services in
the EU member states.
Crisis communication strategies are designed to
be able to inform the public in a responsible way.
They form an integral part of the preparations
described in the previous section. Among the mea-
sures to be considered are the identification of
authoritative sources of information for the public
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of procedures to maintain communication even
under the gravest of circumstances. Both the
national and EU authorities should conclude agree-
ments with different types of media in order to
prevent as much as possible wrong or sensationalist
reporting that might contribute to panic. In addi-
tion, political authorities and key personnel should
receive training in crisis communication. The com-
munication strategies at high-risk industrial facil-
ities and industrial evacuation procedures probably
offer a good starting point.
Simulation exercises and training in crisis
response and management are required at all levels
of decision making and across the multiple agencies
that would be involved in a large-scale emergency.
They must involve local, regional and national poli-
ticians, the people responsible for managing and
overseeing emergency responses, and the press.
Tabletop exercises for the highest levels of deci-
sion makers focus on overall co-ordination and com-
munication strategies with the different services
and commanders on the scene of the incident. While
single-day exercises suffice to test certain compo-
nents of the emergency procedures, the need exists
to plan occasional simulations that may last several
days to examine the overall integration of these
components. The tabletop exercises are comple-
mented by realistic, multiple-day field exercises
simulating the exercise on the ground. It is impera-
tive that the simulations are carried through to their
planned end, even if situations emerge that are
unpalatable to democracies.
EU members are already conducting such simula-
tions with regard to incidents at nuclear or industrial
facilities or major accidents, and the exercises for
biological terrorism can build on these experiences.
However, industrial disasters like the ones in Seweso
(1976) or Bhopal (1984) or the recent outbreak of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) suggest
the need to develop and test the emergency pro-
cedures at all levels. Many lessons can also be
learned from the terrorist strikes against the Twin
Towers in New York on 11 September 2001.
In Europe, with its many small countries, a need
exists to run cross-border training exercises
whereby the organization of emergency response
procedures among EU members is tested and
improved (e.g., by discovering and resolving legal
and bureaucratic obstacles preventing emergency
and law enforcement or specialized military units to
operate on the territory of another EU member).
Similarly, the EU-wide technical assistance programs
mentioned above must be tested in practice.
The important point to bear in mind is that the
preparation and finetuning of procedures takesmany years, and these activities should be under-
taken sooner rather than later.
What are the WHO recommendations?
The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the delivery
of anthrax spores through the mail shortly after-
wards considerably magnified the threat percep-
tions regarding biological terrorism. The effects
were not limited to the United States: the many
reports of anthrax attack hoaxes in other countries
increased threat awareness across the world. As a
direct consequence, the WHO updated its guidance
with regard to smallpox and expanded the smallpox
section of its website with advice and background
information (URL <http://www.who.int/csr/dis-
ease/smallpox/en/>). On 26 October 2001, Direc-
tor-General Gro Harlem Brundtland announced the
conclusion in a press statement:
‘‘Existing vaccines have proven efficacy but also
have a high incidence of adverse side-effects. The
risk of adverse events is sufficiently high that mass
vaccination is not warranted if there is no or little
real risk of exposure. Individual countries that have
reason to believe that their people face an
increased risk of smallpox because of deliberate
use of the virus are considering options for increas-
ing their access to vaccines. The vaccines would be
given to people who are at risk of exposure to
smallpox, including health and civil workers, and
would be used in a search and containment exercise
should an outbreak occur.’’
The WHO thus recommended against the vaccina-
tion of entire populations or large groups of emer-
gency personnel because of the relatively low risk of
an outbreak and the possibility of adverse health
effects of the vaccine. Only those people who are
suspected of actually having been exposed to the
disease should receive the vaccine, or individuals
working with pox viruses (including smallpox and
monkey pox). It also confirmed its proved strategy
of ‘search and containment’, which involves the
identification and vaccination of people with small-
pox and those who have been in contact with
infected people. At the same time, the WHO advises
governments with respect to the quality of the
vaccine inventories and the possible need to increase
stocks of vaccine for use in the event of an outbreak.
Following the WHO updating its guidance, many
countries have undertaken reviews of their smallpox
vaccine inventories and their measures to respond
to a possible outbreak.
Meanwhile the destruction of the last inventories
of smallpox strains in the two WHO-designated
repositories, namely the Centers for Disease Control
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and the State Research Centre of Virology and
Biotechnology in Koltsovo, Russia, has been post-
poned in order to allow further research into the
virus and new generations of vaccine. This con-
firmed a decision already reached in December
1999.
The WHO also participates in many interregional
and global initiatives to prevent or manage smallpox
outbreaks.
Which measures is the European Union
currently undertaking?
Especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001 and the subsequent mailing of anthrax
spores in the USA, the European Union (EU) is taking
a number of steps in the sphere of health security to
improve its preparedness and response capabilities
with regard to biological and chemical agent
attacks. In particular, it has set up a rapid alert
system-biological chemical attack (RAS-BICHAT),
which became operational in June 2002 and func-
tions 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The EU has
reviewed lists of pathogens and developed a matrix
for prioritizing public health actions. Furthermore,
a platform of cooperation has been set up between
public health laboratories in the EU member states,
and a network of high safety laboratories was cre-
ated.
Smallpox is included in this list of reviewed
pathogens. The Health Security Committee (which
was set up by the EU Commission in October 2001 to
expedite the development of laws and regulations)
also prepared case definitions for surveillance pur-
poses (which will eventually become mandatory for
all EU members) and clinical guidelines. In addition,
the EU Commission organized the sharing of infor-
mation on smallpox emergency plans, and made
comparative analyses of the respective measures
and alert levels. At the request of the EU Commis-
sion in November 2001, the European Medicines
Evaluation Agency (EMEA) created two expert
groups, one of which was to develop specific recom-
mendations and guidance regarding vaccines, in
particular those against smallpox. It has published
draft guidance on the development of vaccines
against smallpox, including second-generation vac-
cines in June 2002. In July 2003, the EU Commission -
partly prompted by the outbreak of SARS - adopted a
proposal to create a European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control.
On 7 November 2001 the EU Commission, the G-7
countries and Mexico agreed on the Global Health
Security Action initiative in Ottawa; other meetings
have taken place or are planned. The initiativeseeks to promote cooperation on smallpox emer-
gency plans and training, laboratory detection tech-
niques, risk management and communication, and
patient isolation techniques, among other things. At
the end of 2002 an exercise based on a smallpox
outbreak was organized to test communication
channels and evaluate existing emergency plans.
Other tests and exercises are being planned. The
WHO is fully associated in these activities, and
participants at the meeting of 6 December 2002
have agreed to replenish the WHO smallpox vaccine
stocks, and to organize a multi-national exercise in
2003 to test the reaction to smallpox contamination
and the development of cooperation between the
high-security laboratories of the participating coun-
tries. The EU, both through the Health Ministers of
the member states and the Commission, participate
in inter-regional and global programs to share sur-
veillance data on possible outbreaks of contagious
diseases.
From November 2001 onwards the EU Commission
entered in discussions with the European Pharma-
ceutical industry, and set up a joint task force to
evaluate the availability and production, storage,
and distribution capacity for vaccines andmedicines
in the event of a biological attack.
Despite the range of efforts to coordinate pre-
paredness and response on the EU level, some EU
members continue to resist the creation of an EU-
level stockpile of any medicine or are uninterested
in the creation of an EU consortium to procure
vaccines or other medicines. Most EU members still
have first generation vaccines against smallpox, but
despite the assessment that these vaccines do meet
present day quality standards, they do not plan on
buying second generation vaccines when they
become available. In line with the advice issued
by the WHO, EU members have confirmed the exis-
tence of a national ‘search and contain’ or ring
vaccination strategy. Several EU members have
meanwhile replenished their smallpox vaccine
stocks.
The EU has made progress in terms of prepared-
ness and response in the case of a major outbreak
of infectious diseases (including smallpox), but the
member states still face several important ques-
tions regarding the degree of EU integration of
health security that they are willing to accept.
The EU has also kept the candidate states that
are joining the EU in 2004 informed of the relevant
measures, but steps still need to be taken so that
the new members meet the overall EU standards in
the shortest possible time frame. There are also
ongoing discussions regarding the wisdom of pre-
emptive mass vaccinations against smallpox (as in
the USA).
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Over the past decade there is a perception of an
increased CBW threat. The threat of terrorists
resorting to biological and chemical agents con-
fronts policy makers with many imponderables.
The identity and the motives of the terrorists can
differ widely; the perpetrators have a broad range
of targets (humans, animals, the food chain, the
environment, and so on) and instruments (in terms
of human, animal and plant pathogens, and toxic
substances) to cause casualties or economic and
societal disruption. Such attacks have been extre-
mely rare in the past, so history offers little gui-
dance as to what the future may hold.
The fear of a deliberate release of the smallpox
virus has been prompted by a combination of fac-
tors, including the revelations about an alleged
Soviet smallpox weaponization program after the
global eradication of the disease and the concern
that former Soviet scientists may have been lured to
other countries to work on similar programs, the
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the mail-
delivered anthrax spores in the United States in
the same month, and the rapid spread of SARS.However, there is no concrete public evidence to
suggest that there exist undeclared holdings of
smallpox outside the official WHO-designated repo-
sitories in the United States and Russia.
Nevertheless, a future outbreak of smallpox -
whether accidental or deliberate - cannot be fully
excluded. The spread of the virus in an increasingly
immunologically naive population could wreak
havoc in the affected societies. Therefore it is
wise for governments and public authorities to
take relevant preventive measures without re-
sorting to mass mobilization of national resources
as if the country is waging total war. Most of these
measures can be generic and cost-effective.
Moreover, they are no dead investments. Society
as a whole will benefit greatly from improvements
in the health and emergency infrastructure and
emergency procedures. However, it is important
for the governments and public authorities to
realize that counter - and preventive measures
must be taken before an outbreak occurs, and
that such preparations take several years before
achieving maximal effectiveness. Here is a clear
and present responsibility of parliaments and
governments.
